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The New Era of NFL Antitrust Law, the 
Sunday Ticket Package: Was the Ninth 




Americans love football, but every year thousands of fans are forced to 
pay exorbitant annual fees if they chose to have access to out-of-market 
games.  In other words, if fans don’t live in the territory of their favorite 
team, they can either pay an excessive annual fee to watch their team play or 
miss out on the majority of games every season.  This arrangement is a 
result of DirecTV’s Sunday Ticket Package, which is an exclusive 
distributorship agreement with the NFL that prevents fans from watching 
live out-of-market games unless they pay the annual subscription fee.  This 
Comment addresses and agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s holding that 
DirecTV’s Sunday Ticket Package and the NFL’s agreement with its teams 
to pool their television rights violates §§ I and II of the Sherman Act, but 
rebuts the court’s decision in granting the plaintiffs antitrust standing.  
Specifically, this Comment will explore the history of antitrust law and how 
it applies to the NFL, present an analysis on how the NFL injured 
competition and monopolized the market of football, and address how the 
Ninth Circuit defied Supreme Court precedent in granting antitrust standing.  
Ultimately, this Comment addresses the antitrust implications of the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling for other professional sports leagues, consumers, and future 
plaintiffs of antitrust litigation, and offers solutions and suggestions for the 
future of television and sports.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Every football season, thousands of fans are forced to pay excessive 
annual fees if they want to watch out-of-market games.1  In other words, if 
you are a loyal supporter of your hometown team but live outside of your 
hometown, you can either opt to pay $293 per season to tune in to watch 
your team play or miss out on the majority of games every season.2 
The National Football League (NFL) is the only professional sports 
league in the United States that has an exclusive distributorship agreement 
with a satellite service provider—DirecTV.3  This distributorship agreement 
prevents fans from watching live out-of-market games, unless they pay an 
annual fee to purchase DirecTV’s Sunday Ticket package for access to all 
games.4  Being the leading provider of professional football in the United 
States with an average of over sixteen million viewers per game, the NFL 
has remained unchallenged since it entered into the agreement with DirecTV 
in 1994.5 
Historically, Congress has exempted the NFL from antitrust law to 
allow the NFL to pool teams’ telecasting rights to all live games and 
negotiate licensing packages with broadcasters collectively.6  From 1994, 
when the NFL and DirecTV entered into the exclusive agreement, until 
2015, each of the thirty-two NFL teams was “independently incorporated, 
owned, and operated.”7  However, in 2015 the NFL incorporated as National 
 
 1. See Amanda Bronstad, Antitrust Claims Reinstated Over NFL’s Sunday Ticket Package, 
LAW.COM (Aug. 14, 2019, 2:43 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2019/08/14/antitrust-claims-
reinstated-over-nfls-sunday-ticket-package/. 
 2. Chantel Buchi, NFL Sunday Ticket Review 2020, REVIEWS.ORG (Aug. 19, 2020), 
https://www.reviews.org/tv-service/nfl-sunday-ticket-review. 
 3. Jon Brodkin, NFL’s Exclusive Deal with DirecTV Is Illegal Monopoly, Lawsuit Claims, ARS 
TECHNICA (July 16, 2015), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/07/nfl-directv-colluded-to-
raise-prices-of-game-broadcasts-lawsuit-claims/. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See Jabari Young, National Football League Television Viewership Increases 5% for 2019 
Regular Season, CNBC (Dec. 31, 2019, 2:11 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/31/nfl-television-
viewership-increases-5percent-for-2019-season.html. 
 6. See Eriq Gardner, NFL Heads to the Supreme Court in TV Rights Case, THE HOLLYWOOD 
REPORTER (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/nfl-tv-rights-why-league-
aims-a-block-an-upheaval-1258901.  
 7. See Haig Siranosian, Ticket to an Antitrust Violation?  Why the NFL and DirecTV’s 
Exclusive Distributorship Agreement for Sunday Ticket May Violate Antitrust Laws, and How the 
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California May Have Gotten It Wrong, 15 HASTINGS 
BUS. L.J. 342, 342 (2019). 
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Football League, Inc. and simultaneously created NFL Enterprises, LLC to 
pool the telecasting rights of the thirty-two teams and license them to 
multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs).8  Up until a recent 
Ninth Circuit decision, the teams had the ability to grant the NFL “the right 
to negotiate pooled television rights on their behalf.”9 
In August 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “it was 
plausible that the ‘horizontal’ agreement among the NFL’s 32 teams to pool 
TV rights along with the league’s ‘vertical’ agreement with [DirecTV] 
amounted to an illegal restraint of competition under the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.”10  Additionally, the court granted antitrust standing to the plaintiffs—
consumers who did not directly purchase the Sunday Ticket package from 
the NFL and historically would not have antitrust standing.11 
This Note addresses and agrees with the court’s holding in finding both 
§ I and § II violations of the Sherman Act, but rebuts the court’s decision in 
granting the plaintiffs antitrust standing.12  Part II provides background on 
antitrust law and how it applies to the NFL, and discusses the material facts 
of the case at bar.13  Part III offers an analysis on how the NFL injured 
competition and monopolized the market, and consequently how the Ninth 
Circuit incorrectly went against Supreme Court precedent in granting 
standing.14  Part IV addresses the antitrust implications of the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling for the NFL, professional sports leagues, and consumers, as well as 
how the grant of standing to the plaintiffs will open the floodgates to future 
 
 8. Id. at 342–43. 
 9. Id. at 343. 
 The NFL contracts with five networks, CBS, FOX, NBC, ESPN, and [the] NFL 
Network, to provide a limited number of live broadcasts every Sunday, Monday night, 
and Thursday [n]ight.  The only way to watch games that are not broadcasted on one of 
the five networks, (e.g., out-of-market games), is to purchase DirecTV’s Sunday Ticket 
package. 
Id. 
 10. Gardner, supra note 6.  
 11. See id.  Plaintiffs are generally not granted standing if they are indirect purchasers—meaning 
they are at least two steps removed from the violator in a chain of distribution—and here, the 
plaintiffs are a class of residents and business owners who purchased the Sunday Ticket package 
from DirecTV, rather than the NFL itself.  See In re Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust 
Litig., 933 F.3d 1136, 1156 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 12. See infra Part V. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
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antitrust litigation.15  Finally, Part V concludes that the Ninth Circuit was 
correct in finding antitrust violations with the interlocking agreements, but 
incorrect in granting standing to the plaintiffs.16 
II. ANTITRUST LAW AND THE NFL 
Historically, antitrust laws have  not been enforced as well as they 
should have been, nor has the government been consistent in such 
enforcement.17  Antitrust laws were born into a progressive era aiming to 
eradicate big businesses monopolizing the market; but, over the years, 
administrations that favored big businesses and encouraged industry-
government relationships halted antitrust enforcement.18  Although the back-
and-forth among administrations’ goals surrounding antitrust enforcement 
continued to shift, in the last fifty years the United States had “neither an 
antitrust movement nor much enforcement.”19 
A. A History of Antitrust Law 
Antitrust laws were established to protect marketplace diversification 
and encourage competition.20  The enforcement of antitrust law “preserves 
competition across all private industries by condemning anticompetitive 
conduct.”21  In 1890, Congress passed the first piece of antitrust legislation, 
the Sherman Antitrust Act,22 to protect consumers and allow small 
businesses to enter into the marketplace with a greater chance of survival.23  
Congress enacted the legislation in response to booming industrialization, 
 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See infra Part V. 
 17. See Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the U.S. Antitrust 
Movement, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/12/the-rise-fall-and-rebirth-of-
the-u-s-antitrust-movement. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Ariel Y. Bublick, Are You Ready for Some Football? How Antitrust Laws Can Be Used to 
Break Up DirecTV’s Exclusive Right to Telecast NFL’s Sunday Ticket Package, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 
223, 225 (2011). 
 21. Babette Boliek, Antitrust, Regulation, and the “New” Rules of Sports Telecasts, 65 
HASTINGS L.J. 501, 509 (2014). 
 22. See Bublick, supra note 20, at 225; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2018). 
 23. CNBC, Google, Facebook, Amazon and the Future of Antitrust Laws, YOUTUBE (Aug. 16, 
2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IcghGCBROR0. 
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which had led to monopolies in the steel, oil, tobacco, and rubber 
industries.24  In 1914, Congress also passed the Clayton Act,25 which was 
intended to “proscribe[] . . . mergers, whose effects ‘may be to substantially 
lessen competition’” as an additional means to prevent anti-competitive 
behavior.26  Furthermore, the federal government established a regulatory 
agency, the Federal Trade Commission, to police competition and ensure 
compliance with both the Sherman and Clayton Acts.27 
Aggressive antitrust enforcement followed the Sherman Act; by 1910, 
the federal government had either broken up or regulated nearly all of the 
existing major monopolies.28  However, the changing political climate that 
accompanied the start of World War I shifted away from the aggressive 
attitude toward antitrust enforcement.29  The country did not want 
“antagonism between the federal government and big business.”30  This shift 
highlighted the ability of antitrust regulations to adapt to the political climate 
of the country, which negatively impacted the ability of the courts and 
federal agencies to regulate antitrust violations.31 
Another shift occurred when World War II began; however, this shift 
generated antitrust enforcement that was even more aggressive than at the 
time of the Sherman Act’s enactment.32  The difference in governmental 
attitude between the two wars can be attributed to Germany’s business 
structure, where “[t]he monopolies . . . got control of Germany, brought 
Hitler to power[,] and forced virtually the whole world into war.”33  
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 278 (1990). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See CNBC, supra note 23. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.  World War I affected the shift in antitrust enforcement because once the United States 
entered into the war, the government felt that a chasm between the government and big businesses—
which fueled the economy in wartime—would cause unnecessary stress among such businesses, 
political agencies, courts, and the President.  See id. 
 31. See id.  Since every administration prior to the Reagan administration advocated for strong 
antitrust enforcement, many saw the Reagan administration as a shift because he entered office with 
the goal of “eliminat[ing] or reduc[ing] government regulation in all areas of business affairs.”  
Willard F. Mueller, Antitrust in the Reagan administration, NO. 21/22 REVUE FRANCAISE D’ETUDES 
AMERICANES 427 (1984). 
 32. See CNBC, supra note 23. 
 33. Tim Wu, Be Afraid of Economic ‘Bigness.’  Be Very Afraid., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/10/opinion/sunday/fascism-economy-monopoly.html. 
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Consequently, because the United States wanted to foster a competitive and 
diverse marketplace, Congress enacted the Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950 to 
strengthen the Clayton Act and ensure avoidance of Germany’s mistake.34 
Although the passage of the Celler-Kefauver Act launched an “era of 
peak antitrust [enforcement],” the sentiment of the government again shifted 
against antitrust enforcement with the adoption of the consumer welfare 
standard by the Supreme Court.35  The Court adopted this standard in Reiter 
v. Sonotone Corp.,36 where it “suggest[ed] that Congress designed the 
Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”37  The objective of the 
consumer welfare standard is to deem an act “anticompetitive ‘only when it 
harms both allocative efficiency and raises the prices of goods above 
competitive levels or diminishes their quality.’”38  Consequently, this case 
made the consumer welfare standard the goal of antitrust law, and the 
election of Ronald Reagan sealed “the fate of aggressive antitrust 
enforcement” by shifting back to passive regulation of antitrust violations.39 
In the last forty years since Ronald Reagan’s administration and the 
standard adopted in Reiter, antitrust enforcement has been relatively passive, 
 
 34. See CNBC, supra note 23; see also Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, 81 Pub. L. No. 899, 64 
State. 1125 (1950). 
 35. See CNBC, supra note 23.  Individuals have attributed this shift either to the stagnant 
economy and a “growth of global competition,” or to the advent of Ronald Reagan’s administration.  
Joe Kennedy, Why the Consumer Welfare Standard Should Remain the Bedrock of Antitrust Policy, 
INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 2 (Oct. 2018), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/ 
20181212/108774/HHRG-115-JU05-20181212-SD004.pdf. 
 36. 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Jonathan Hatch & Meghan Larywon, Congress Hears Challenges to the Consumer Welfare 
Standard, JD SUPRA (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/congress-hears-
challenges-to-the-95586/. 
The consumer welfare standard . . . offers a fairly objective standard for measuring the 
effect of potential anticompetitive behavior . . . [that] looks at economic benefits more 
broadly . . . [, and] mergers that harm consumers, at least in the short run, might still be 
approved when the harm is outweighed by benefits to the overall economy, including 
higher productivity.   
Kennedy, supra note 35, at 4–5.  While champions of the standard see the benefits come to fruition 
when society has higher tax revenues and wages, and companies can use additional revenue to invest 
in “innovation, which . . . eventually benefit[s] consumers,” critics would like to see consumer 
benefits more in the short term, rather than down the line.  Id. at 5.  These critics also have additional 
concerns about “any policy that transfers welfare from consumers to companies, even when overall 
welfare increases.”  Id. 
 39. CNBC, supra note 23. 
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which is evident in data reflecting industry-specific market concentration.40  
Between 1982 and 2012, the economic concentration of industries—such as 
manufacturing, utilities, and finance—increased exponentially, “sometimes 
by triple digit percentages.”41  Furthermore, “between 1996 and 2016, the 
amount of companies on the stock market [declined] by half.”42  
Additionally, since 1996, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
challenged fewer major mergers than ever before.43  These statistics reflect 
the current state of antitrust law, resulting in skepticism about the future of 
antitrust enforcement.44  Specifically, there is skepticism about what the next 
point of contention will be for antitrust law with future administrations and 
even federal exemptions, such as the NFL’s telecasting rights.45 
While Major League Baseball (MLB) is best known in the antitrust 
debate for its distinctive exemption from federal antitrust law,46 the NFL has 
a similar federal exemption through the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 
(SBA) that allows NFL teams to act jointly on television contracts.47  
 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id.  Other industries include retail, wholesale trade, and service industries.  Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id.  This passive inaction on behalf of the FTC has resulted in “four major domestic 
airlines, four major telecommunications carriers, three major drugstores, and two major beer 
retailers.”  Id.  Furthermore, “[t]he FTC’s failure to bring cases does not . . . mean anticompetitive 
conduct has disappeared[,] [r]ather, . . . recessions intensify the pressures and incentives to evade the 
discipline of competition.”  Mueller, supra note 31, at 431.  This is not “‘lean and mean’ 
enforcement.  It represents a law enforcement famine.”  Id.  More recently, in 2020, a federal judge 
approved the merger between T-Mobile and Sprint.  Arriana McLymore & Diane Bartz, T-Mobile-
Sprint Merger Wins Approval from U.S. Judge, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2020, 3:44 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sprint-corp-m-a-t-mobile/t-mobile-sprint-merger-wins-approval-
from-u-s-judge-idUSKBN2042MG.  The judge approved the deal despite a group of attorneys 
general from multiple states challenging the transaction on grounds that it would violate antitrust 
laws.  Id. 
 44. See CNBC, supra note 23. 
 45. See Steven Malanga, Bench the NFL: The League Enjoys an Antitrust Exemption from 
Washington That Should Have Been Revoked Years Ago, CITY JOURNAL (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://www.city-journal.org/html/bench-nfl-15465.html. 
 46. See id.; see also Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 
259 U.S. 200, 208 (1992) (holding that baseball teams are not involved in interstate commerce). 
 47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–95 (2018); see also infra note 133 and accompanying text (explaining the 
SBA).  League leadership successfully lobbied for the NFL exemption in the 1960s.  See Malanga, 
supra note 45.  This came after a court ruling that prevented NFL teams from jointly negotiating 
broadcasting rights, because a negotiation of such rights would be an antitrust violation that would 
constitute a monopoly.  Id.  Thus, successful lobbying led to the SBA, “allowing [the] teams to pool 
their efforts for the sake of negotiating TV deals.”  Id.  The result was that prices for broadcasting 
packages skyrocketed.  Id.  Additionally, the act did not just apply to the NFL, but to professional 
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Historically, the NFL’s federal exemption has been controversial because, 
although the SBA applies to other professional sports, professional football 
has significantly fewer games per season compared to other sports.48  Thus, 
the benefits to the NFL outweigh those to other sports because the NFL 
“exclusively and collectively sells all its TV rights through monopoly 
pooling, then distributes the revenues to teams equally.”49  The NFL 
navigated the benefits of the SBA without challenge until the league began 
to black out games50 and entered into its first rights deal with ESPN.51  
Because the SBA had historically only covered telecasting of games through 
broadcast, this was uncharted territory for determining whether the ESPN 
cable contract violated the SBA.52  Although “the NFL [avoided] that crisis 
when the Justice Department declined to pursue” the matter, the issue of a 
potential SBA violation came up again with the onset of the NFL Network—
the NFL’s own cable channel—on which it only aired games to “a limited 
number of subscribers.”53  Currently, the NFL is again being faced with a 
potential SBA violation because of its DirecTV Sunday Ticket package and 
its alleged §§ I and II violations of the Sherman Act.54 
B. Sections I and II of the Sherman Act; Vertical and Horizontal 
Agreements and Monopolies 
Congress enacted the Sherman Act once it had witnessed both the force 
and momentum of business concentration in the United States.55  The 
 
basketball, hockey, and baseball as well.  Id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Id. (emphasis added).  The significance of this exemption to the NFL is best understood 
when analyzing how the NFL teams would negotiate TV rights individually without this exemption.  
Id.  Specifically, “powerful teams like the Dallas Cowboys” would likely be able to negotiate having 
their games nationally broadcasted, but this would be “less advantageous for weak[er] teams such as 
the Cleveland Browns, [who] might struggle even for local coverage.”  Id. 
 50. Sports Blackouts, FED. COMM. COMMISSION (last updated Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/sports-blackouts.  A black-out means that if tickets for a 
particular game are still available, the game will not be shown on television in the home city.  Id. 
 51. See Malanga, supra note 45.  The new rights deal with ESPN was an additional factor that 
triggered the controversy of the NFL’s television pooling rights under the SBA because this was the 
first deal of its kind that dealt with cable.  See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See infra Sections II.B–II.C. 
 55. See Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 17. 
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Sherman Act allowed the Justice Department to regulate “unreasonable 
restraints of trade and monopolistic abuses” before it was too late.56 
1. The Interplay Between Sections I and II of the Sherman Act 
Section I of the Sherman Act establishes the most contested area of 
antitrust law that has “plagued the NFL the most.”57  Section I states that 
“every contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to 
be illegal.”58  However, the Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States59 
narrowed the reach of the statute by stating that “an agreement is in violation 
of Section One if the ‘contracts or acts . . . were unreasonably restrictive of 
competitive conditions.’”60  In its analysis of whether such a contract or act 
is unreasonable, a court must determine whether an agreement is clearly 
anticompetitive and apply the appropriate test.61 
Courts assess an agreement’s unreasonableness “under either a per se 
rule of illegality or a rule of reason analysis.”62  A per se violation is 
reserved for clearly anticompetitive agreements “and require[s] no further 
analysis.”63  Conversely, if a restraint is not a per se violation, courts use a 
rule of reason analysis to test whether the agreement is merely regulatory or 
anticompetitive in nature.64  A “rule of reason analysis requires the plaintiff 
to establish (1) an agreement or conspiracy between two or more persons or 
entities; (2) through which the persons or entities intend to harm or restrain 
competition; and, (3) that actually does restrain competition.”65  Courts 
weigh both the competitive and anticompetitive effects of the agreement by 
examining the rationale behind the restraint and the “degree of collusion 
associated with” it, which involves the history of the restraint and the 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Bublick, supra note 20, at 225. 
 58. Id. at 255 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018)).  
 59. 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911). 
 60. See Bublick, supra note 20, at 225 (emphasis added) (quoting Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 
58). 
 61. See Siranosian, supra note 7, at 344–45. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 345. 
 64. See Bublick, supra note 20, at 226. 
 65. Siranosian, supra note 7, at 345. 
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significance of the restraint “on the relevant market.”66  Initially, the burden 
of proof is on the plaintiff to establish the anticompetitive nature of the 
agreement.67  However, if the defendant can justify the agreement, the 
burden shifts back onto the plaintiff to show “a less restrictive alternative” 
than the current agreement “while still achieving the defendant’s goal.”68 
Within § I, courts analyze two types of agreements: vertical and 
horizontal agreements.69  A vertical agreement is an agreement “entered 
[into] among different levels of the supply chain, for example between a 
manufacturer and a distributor.”70  Under a rule of reason analysis, an 
exclusive deal between a parent and a subsidiary would be a § I violation if 
its objective was to prevent competition in a sizable share of the affected 
market.71  In this situation, the plaintiff would have the burden of proving 
that the arrangement would likely keep “at least one significant competitor 
of the defendant from doing business in a relevant market.”72  While vertical 
agreements may potentially be deemed a violation of antitrust law, they are 
not per se violations.73 
On the other hand, a horizontal agreement is an agreement between 
competitors on the same level of market structure.74  In other words, a 
horizontal agreement is “an agreement among competitors on the way in 
which they will compete with one another.”75  This results in blatant 
restraints with no objective other than to hinder competition.76  These types 
of agreements are generally considered “illegal per se.”77  Customarily, a 
horizontal agreement is ruled illegal per se because “surrounding 
circumstances make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to 
 
 66. Bublick, supra note 20, at 226. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Siranosian, supra note 7, at 343, 346. 
 70. Id. at 346. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. at 347. 
 74. See id. at 356 (explaining that a horizontal agreement is “an agreement between competitors 
that restricts supply”). 
 75. Bublick, supra note 20, at 225 (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of 
the Univ. of Okla. 468 U.S. 85, 99–100 (1984)). 
 76. See id. at 225–26. 
 77. Id. 
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render unjustified further examination of the challenged conduct.”78  
Because of the increased likelihood that these types of agreements are per se 
violations, courts will generally hold them invalid without further analysis.79 
Section II of the Sherman Act states that “every person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony.”80  There are two separate claims to establish under § II: a conspiracy 
to monopolize and actual monopolization.81  To demonstrate a conspiracy to 
monopolize claim, a plaintiff must show “1) the existence of a combination 
or conspiracy to monopolize; 2) an overt act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy; 3) the specific intent to monopolize; and 4) causal antitrust 
injury.”82  To demonstrate an actual monopolization claim, a plaintiff must 
establish “a) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market; b) 
the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power; and c) causal antitrust 
injury.”83  Accordingly, a court will likely find that a monopoly power exists 
if a company can profitably increase prices considerably above the 
competitive level.84 
C. The NFL and Its Monopolization of the Football Market 
Sections I and II of the Sherman Act lay the foundation for the interplay 
between competition and cooperation that has landed the NFL in court when 
it either violated, or came close to violating, federal antitrust law.85  The 
NFL has not only faced antitrust scrutiny with its television agreements, but 
with both its licensing and franchise relocation agreements.86 
 
 78. Id. (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. 468 U.S. 
85, 103–04 (1984)). 
 79. See id. 
 80. Siranosian, supra note 7, at 366 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018)). 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Michael McCann, Why DirecTV’s NFL Sunday Ticket Might Be Illegal Under Antitrust 
Law, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.si.com/nfl/2019/08/14/nfl-sunday-ticket-
directv-antitrust-violation-lawsuit (discussing the cases involving the NFL’s potential violations of 
§§ I and II of the Sherman Act). 
 86. See Bublick, supra note 20, at 228–29. 
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1. The Single-Entity Defense 
Historically, the NFL has been scrutinized for violating antitrust laws, 
and it has consistently attempted to use a single-entity defense to bypass the 
legal consequences.87  This defense was first established in Copperweld 
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., where the Court held: 
[T]he coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned 
subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes 
of § 1 of the Sherman Act.  A parent and its wholly owned 
subsidiary have a complete unity of interest.  Their objectives are 
common, not disparate; their general corporate actions are guided or 
determined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but 
one.88 
In Copperweld, the Court established that because a parent and its 
subsidiary were considered one entity, their economic interests are also 
joint.89  Relying on Copperweld’s holding, the NFL began to use the same 
rationale in an attempt to qualify as a single entity by utilizing its internal 
structure.90 
The NFL is currently categorized as an “unincorporated 501(c)(6) 
association (a tax-exempt, nonprofit association) of separately-owned and 
operated franchises (teams).”91  However, if the NFL wanted to be regarded 
as a single entity, the NFL would have to be considered the parent to all 
thirty-two subsidiary teams, which are considered franchises.92  If it were to 
do so, according to Copperweld, the NFL and its teams could be considered 
a single enterprise and therefore not be in violation of § I of the Sherman Act 
based on the parent-subsidiary structure.93 
 
 87. See id. at 227–30 (tracing the NFL’s use of the single-entity defense in response to antitrust 
violations). 
 88. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Bublick, supra note 20, at 227. 
 91. Id.  The thirty-two teams have the option of organizing as their preferred business entity.  See 
id.  However, most of the teams organize as corporations, partnerships, or sole proprietorships.  See 
id. 
 92. See id. at 227–30 (tracing the NFL’s attempts to be considered a single entity with its thirty-
two subsidiary franchises).  
 93. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771 (“[T]he coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly 
owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman 
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Franchise relocation and allocation of licensing rights to various apparel 
companies have been the two most notable areas of antitrust law in which 
the NFL has faced scrutiny; thus, this is where the NFL has attempted to use 
the single-entity defense.94  In 1978, the Oakland Raiders attempted to 
relocate their franchise to Los Angeles, which was already home to another 
franchise, the Los Angeles Rams.95  The Raiders’ attempted relocation to the 
home territory of another franchise required unanimous approval of all NFL 
franchise owners, who ultimately voted against the Raiders.96  Consequently, 
the owner of the Raiders, Al Davis, sued the NFL in Los Angeles Memorial 
Coliseum Commission v. NFL, alleging that the requirement of unanimous 
approval by all NFL franchise owners was a violation of § I of the Sherman 
Act.97  The NFL endeavored to employ the single-entity defense, but its 
attempt failed.98  The Ninth Circuit feared that granting the NFL “single 
entity status would immunize [it] from any § 1 scrutiny.”99  The court held 
that the “unique structure” of the organization generally precluded the NFL 
from being per se illegal, and all actions taken by the NFL should be subject 
to the rule of reason.100  Thus, the court found that, because the teams were 
sufficiently independent and competitive with one another, the NFL’s 
single-entity defense failed.101 
 In 2001, the NFL again attempted to utilize a single-entity defense to 
the litigation that resulted when the NFL permitted teams to “sell 
nonexclusive licensing rights to multiple apparel companies,” resulting in a 
 
Act.”). 
 94. See Bublick, supra note 20, at 228. 
 95. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
 96. Id. at 1384–85. 
 97. Id. at 1385. 
 98. Id. at 1387–89. 
 99. Id. at 1388.  
 100. Id. at 1392. 
 101. Id. at 1389.  The court emphasized that the independent teams operate as “separate business 
entities whose products have an independent value.”  Id.  Furthermore, each team is independently 
owned, and although “a large portion of League revenue . . . is divided equally among the teams, 
profits and losses are not shared.”  Id. at 1390.  These qualities of the teams contribute to making 
each team “an entity in large part distinct from the NFL.”  Id.  The court is careful to acknowledge 
that although it is true the teams must cooperate to put together a football game, it is not true “that 
each club can produce football games only as an NFL member.”  Id. (quoting L.A. Mem’l Coliseum 
Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 519 F. Supp. 581, 584 (C.D. Cal. 1981)). 
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rapid increase of licenses that created an “inventory glut.”102  To remedy the 
influx of licenses, the NFL granted “an exclusive license to a single 
company for all the teams’ apparel” with all profits equally split among the 
thirty-two teams.103  In opposition, American Needle, an apparel company 
that had a nonexclusive license with the New Orleans Saints to manufacture 
apparel for the team, brought suit against the NFL for a violation of § I of 
the Sherman Act.104  In American Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans Louisiana 
Saints, the NFL succeeded in being categorized as a single entity at the 
district court level.105  The Seventh Circuit affirmed, and was careful to 
acknowledge that although all thirty-two teams may potentially have 
competing interests with respect to use of their intellectual property, it did 
not preclude the teams from functioning as a single entity.106  However, 
because the NFL is made up of thirty-two teams that compete against one 
another “on and off the field,” they are not one entity but rather competitors 
meant to compete.107  Therefore, while the court was willing to recognize the 
NFL as a single entity in the instance of merchandising licenses, it was 
careful not to extend single-entity status to all NFL business activities.108 
Rather than accept the Seventh Circuit’s decision in being regarded as a 
single entity solely within the context of merchandising licenses, the NFL 
wanted to ensure the organization was recognized as a single entity for all 
business activities.109  Accordingly, it appealed the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision.110  To the NFL’s detriment, the Supreme Court rejected the 
league’s attempt to be recognized as a single entity for any purpose other 
than merchandising licenses.111  The Court reasoned that “[i]f the fact that 
potential competitors shared in profits or losses from a venture meant that 
the venture was immune from [§ I], then any cartel ‘could evade [] antitrust 
laws simply by creating a “joint venture” to serve as the exclusive seller of 
 
 102. Bublick, supra note 20, at 229 (quoting Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An 
Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 735–36 (2010)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. McCann, supra note 85. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010).  
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their competing products.’”112  Thus, while the Court denied the NFL single-
entity status for purposes other than marketing individually owned 
intellectual property, it recognized there are instances where the organization 
would need a collective agreement among all the franchises.113 
2. The Evolution of the NFL and Sports Broadcasting 
Since Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum and American Needle, the NFL 
has been hauled into court regarding scrutiny over its exclusive 
distributorship agreement with DirectTV.114  In the 1950s, the NFL teams 
independently contracted with broadcast stations to telecast the games.115  
Similar to the proliferation of licenses with merchandising, the numerous 
contracts spawned fear “that over-competition for attention of each team was 
going to bankrupt” the teams.116  In response, the NFL added Article X to its 
bylaws to prevent individual teams from broadcasting their games into the 
home territory of another franchise without permission from the home 
team.117  However, the effect of Article X put the NFL on the radar of the 
Department of Justice for potential antitrust violations.118 
In United States v. National Football League (NFL I), the court 
considered, for the first time, a potentially legitimate purpose for a 
monopoly on local broadcasting by the NFL.119  Proponents of the monopoly 
argued that a monopoly would allow both strong and weak teams to “build a 
strong fan base and generate revenue[;] [o]therwise, ‘the stronger teams 
 
 112. Id. at 201 (quoting Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 335 
(2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
 113. Id. at 204 (“[T]he interest in maintaining a competitive balance . . . is, however, 
unquestionably an interest that may well justify a variety of collective decisions made by the 
teams.”); see also Bublick, supra note 20, at 230 (“The Court did acknowledge that some decisions 
by the NFL require an agreement among the thirty-two teams.”).  Such instances might include the 
collective bargaining agreement for the salary caps of each franchise and the rules of the game.  
Bublick, supra note 20, at 230. 
 114. In re Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 933 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 115. Id. at 1144. 
 116. Bublick, supra note 20, at 231. 
 117. Id.  This permitted each team in “a seventy-five mile radius” to broadcast a game “without 
fear that another team would broadcast its game on a different station within the same market.”  Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id.; see also United States v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953) 
[hereinafter NFL I]. 
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would be likely to drive the weaker ones into financial failure.’”120  Further, 
such financial failure would lead to the demise of the entire league.121  
Although the court found a portion of Article X to be a “reasonable . . . legal 
restraint,”122 it denied the NFL’s attempt to “restrict[] the telecast[ing] of all 
outside games [if] the home team was playing . . . away.”123 
In 1950, while navigating the limitations of Article X and the NFL I 
decision, the NFL entered into an agreement with the Columbia 
Broadcasting System (CBS) “to broadcast ‘certain NFL regular season 
games for $1.8 million per year.’”124  Under the CBS agreement, individual 
teams still controlled the right to broadcast games.125  Eventually, the NFL 
mirrored the American Football League (AFL) by merging all of the 
broadcasting rights of the franchises through a multimillion-dollar contract 
with CBS.126  This agreement led to a revision of the court’s decision in NFL 
I in United States v. National Football League (NFL II).127  The court this 
time found the agreement to be “an unreasonable restraint of trade . . . in 
violation of the holding in NFL I.”128  NFL II held that CBS’s capacity to 
dictate where games were to be telecasted amounted to an “agreement 
among all the teams of a restriction on NFL games.”129  Consequently, the 
decision in NFL II restricted not only the contract between the NFL and 
CBS, but all similar contracts that “involved pooling revenues.”130 
After facing heightened judicial scrutiny regarding antitrust violations, 
 
 120. Bublick, supra note 20, at 231 (quoting NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 323). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 325–26 (“The first type of restriction imposed by Article X is a 
reasonable one and a legal restraint of trade.”).  The court found this restraint to be rational because 
telecasting out-of-market games in the same territory as a home game adversely affects the 
attendance at the home game.  See id. at 325. 
 123. Bublick, supra note 20, at 231 (emphasis added); see also NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 326–27.  
The court reasoned that because the home team is away from its home territory, the telecasting of 
outside games would not affect attendance.  Bublick, supra note 20, at 231. 
 124. Bublick, supra note 20, at 232 (quoting U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 
F.2d 1335, 1346 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 232–33; see also United States v. Nat’l Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445, 446 (E.D. 
Pa. 1961) [hereinafter NFL II]. 
 128. Bublick, supra note 20, at 232–33.  
 129. Id. at 232; see also NFL II, 196 F. Supp. at 447. 
 130. Bublick, supra note 20, at 233. 
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the NFL sought congressional relief.131  As a result of the NFL’s persistent 
lobbying, Congress enacted the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (SBA),132 
which states: 
The antitrust laws, as defined in [§] 1 of the Act . . . shall not apply 
to any joint agreement by or among persons engaging in or 
conducting the organized professional team sports of football, 
baseball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs 
participating in professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey 
contests sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of 
such league’s member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the 
games . . . .133 
The SBA effectively reversed NFL II, allowing the NFL to pool the 
broadcasting rights of all thirty-two teams together and “earn more money 
[for the entire league] than would otherwise be possible if teams sold their 
broadcast rights individually.”134  Importantly, the SBA applied not only to 
the NFL, but to all other professional sports leagues.135  Without the SBA, 
the television contracts of all the professional sports leagues “would be 
subjected to judicial scrutiny and litigation expenses to determine the 
antitrust legality of [similar] agreement[s].”136 
 
 131. See id. 
 132. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–95 (2018). 
 133. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018).  The SBA allowed the leagues to be exempt from antitrust 
violations if they entered into pooled-rights contracts.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–95.  More importantly, the 
SBA only provided an exemption for broadcast television, not for cable or satellite.  Id. 
 134. Ross C. Paolino, Upon Further Review: How NFL Network is Violating the Sherman Act, 16 
SPORTS LAW J. 1, 8–9 (2009). 
 135. Id. at 9. 
 136. Id.  While the SBA carved out an exclusive exemption for professional sports leagues, 
college football remained subject to antitrust law and the Sherman Act.  In re Nat’l Football 
League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 933 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2019).  The realm of college 
football is significant because the Supreme Court’s decision in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) [hereinafter Board of Regents] 
impacted the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in the case at bar.  Id. at 1154.  Similar to the NFL, the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) also had a restriction on the number of televised games 
permitted, which colleges eventually challenged to secure profitable television deals for their 
respective teams.  Id. at 1146.  The court “struck down the NCAA’s restrictive telecast agreements 
as [a] violati[on] [of] the Sherman Act.”  Id.  The court found that by restricting colleges from 
competing against one another “on the basis of price or [the] kind of television rights that can be 
offered to broadcasters,” the NCAA had effectively created a horizontal restraint in violation of § I 
of the Sherman Act.  Id. (quoting Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99).  Because the court’s decision 
[Vol. 48: 537, 2021] The New Era of NFL Antitrust Law 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
555 
Following SBA guidelines, the NFL entered into an exclusive 
broadcasting contract with CBS, pooling the rights of the teams between the 
1962 and 1963 seasons.137  The network again succeeded in outbidding other 
networks for the 1964 and 1965 seasons, but a 1966 merger between the 
NFL and the AFL required Congress to amend the SBA.138  The amendment 
was necessary to absorb the new entity within current antitrust 
exemptions.139  However, the amended SBA conditioned that the antitrust 
exemption would apply only if the NFL contracted with, at minimum, two 
broadcast networks.140  Since then, “the NFL has broadcast licenses with 
CBS, FOX, NBC, and ESPN.”141  Generally, the antitrust exemptions the 
SBA provides have “prove[n] controversial,” and the advent of the DirecTV 
Sunday Ticket package has complicated the exemption.142 
 
allowed college football teams to compete in the marketplace, “broadcasters collectively [paid] half 
as much for the rights” to telecast more games than the NCAA’s collective deal previously 
permitted.  Id. at 1147 (quoting Nathaniel Grow, Regulating Professional Sports Leagues, 72 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 573, 617 (2015)).  In comparison, the “NFL’s control over the pooled broadcasting 
rights [under the SBA] increased revenues from telecasting . . . while decreasing the number of 
telecasts available to consumers.”  Id. 
 137. See Bublick, supra note 20, at 234. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id.  The purpose for Congress’s amendment to the SBA in 1966 was “specifically to 
confer antitrust immunity on the NFL–AFL merger.”  U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football 
League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1347 (2d Cir. 1988).  “In passing this legislation, Congress was plainly 
informed that, upon consolidation of the two leagues, the NFL would have broadcast contracts with 
at least two networks.”  Id. 
 141. See Bublick, supra note 20, at 235.  Among these networks, CBS and FOX have the rights to 
broadcast games on Sundays at 1:00 p.m. and 4:15 p.m. EST, NBC has the exclusive right to 
broadcast primetime games on Sundays at 7:30 p.m. EST, and ESPN has the exclusive right to 
broadcast primetime Monday night games.  See id.  Meanwhile, the NFL Network has the right to air 
eight to sixteen Thursday night games.  See id. at 236.  The NFL established requirements for CBS 
and FOX, as part of their agreements, to “broadcast the local team’s home game, but only if the 
home team is playing an away game or if the home team sold out its stadium attendance that week.”  
See id. at 235.  “However, if a home team does not sell out all of its stadium’s tickets, the station 
must blackout the home team’s game and display another game instead.”  See id. (emphasis added).  
Both the NFL Network and ESPN, non-broadcast channels, have faced scrutiny for being in 
violation of antitrust laws because they both generate revenue from sponsored telecasting in addition 
to cable subscriptions, which some have argued do not fall within the SBA antitrust exemption.  See 
id. at 235–36.  Furthermore, the NFL Network is a channel that is available only to limited 
households and is more expensive than an average cable bundle.  See id. at 236. 
 142. Malanga, supra note 45. 
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3. The Sunday Ticket Package 
The telecasting rights “to free, over-the-air television networks” is 
unquestionably within the bounds of the SBA.143  However, the 
advancement of technology “from over-the-air cable to satellite television” 
has directed the NFL and other professional sports leagues to use “new 
methods of distributing telecasts of the games.”144  DirecTV is a “direct 
broadcast satellite service” that entered into an exclusive agreement with the 
NFL in 1994 to be “the sole distributor” of the NFL Sunday Ticket.145  “The 
NFL Sunday Ticket is an out-of-market sports package” where “a viewer 
can . . . watch any of the thirteen NFL afternoon games,” rather than be 
limited to the local games being telecast by FOX and CBS networks.146  The 
blackout rule that applies to CBS and FOX also applies to the Sunday Ticket 
package, meaning that DirecTV blacks out the home games of local teams 
for Sunday Ticket subscribers who reside within the market if the stadium 
does not sell all of its tickets.147  In 2002, the NFL renewed its contract with 
DirecTV once the prior contract expired.148  In 2009, DirecTV again 
renewed the contract with the NFL to continue being the exclusive provider 
of the Sunday Ticket package until the end of the 2014 season.149  In 2014, 
 
 143. In re Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 933 F.3d 1136, 1147 (9th Cir. 
2019). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Bublick, supra note 20, at 237–38.  The advent of new television technology has resulted 
in courts weighing the challenges that arise with “telecasting arrangements between sports leagues 
and satellite television services.”  Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1147 (quoting Shaw v. Dallas 
Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 301 (3d Cir. 1999)).  Courts have concluded that 
“‘sponsored telecasting’ refers to broadcasts which are financed by business enterprises (the 
‘sponsors’) in return for advertising time and are therefore provided free to the general public.”  Id. 
(quoting Shaw, 172 F.3d at 301).  As a result, contracts with either satellite or cable services that 
charge subscribers fees are not exempt from antitrust liability under the SBA.  Id. 
 146. Bublick, supra note 20, at 237.  Under this agreement, “the NFL allows DirecTV to obtain all 
of the live telecasts produced by CBS and FOX, package [them], and deliver the bundled feeds to 
NFL Sunday Ticket subscribers.”  Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1148.  Thus, DirecTV gives 
subscribers “access to both local and out-of-market games.”  Id.  The Sunday Ticket package 
benefits those football fans who live outside of the market their favorite team plays in, but who do 
not want local channels to restrict their access to view out-of-market games.  See Siranosian, supra 
note 7, at 342. 
 147. See Bublick, supra note 20, at 238. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id.  In 2002, “several cable companies acting as a consortium” bid on the valued package 
to be the nonexclusive carrier of the Sunday Ticket package; however, the NFL rejected their bid 
and instead chose to renew with DirecTV.  Id.  While the NFL claims this rejection was due to the 
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the NFL, once more, renewed its exclusive contract with DirecTV for an 
additional eight years.150  As of 2020, the cost of a full season package for 
individual subscribers is $293, compared to the $1,458 cost for commercial 
subscribers per season.151 
Currently, all thirty-two teams, “each of which is a separate 
‘independently owned, and independently managed business,’” have “an 
agreement with the NFL . . . to pool their telecasting rights and give the NFL 
the authority to exercise those rights.”152  Consequently, the NFL (acting as 
the parent to its subsidiary teams) “entered into two . . . agreements licensing 
the teams’ telecast rights: (1) ‘the NFL-Network Agreement,’ which governs 
‘local games,’ and (2) ‘the NFL-DirecTV Agreement,’ which governs ‘out-
of-market games.’”153  The resulting burdens of these agreements are: 
(1) football fans who do not subscribe to the Sunday Ticket package will 
have “access to, at most, two to three local games each Sunday afternoon;” 
(2) these fans may not purchase games per team or per game, but rather must 
purchase the entire package; and (3) in addition to purchasing the package, 
subscribers must have a “basic television package from DirecTV.”154  The 
resulting deprivation to the NFL football fans, in addition to the “alleged 
antitrust problem with the Sunday Ticket,” has led not only to significant 
litigation, but has also financially harmed consumers.155 
 
bids of the cable companies being late, the cable companies believe the rejection was attributable to 
the cable companies’ refusal to carry the NFL Network.  Id. at 238–39. 
 150. Brian Stelter & Frank Pallotta, DirecTV, NFL Renew Sunday Ticket Deal, CNN (Oct. 2, 
2014, 1:08 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2014/10/01/media/directv/.  It is worth noting that the NFL, 
once again, did entertain other potential bids for the package.  Id.  Ultimately the renewal with 
DirecTV was important to both parties.  Id.  Notably, when AT&T acquired DirecTV in early 2014, 
there was a clause in the agreement that stipulated AT&T’s ability to withdraw from the agreement 
if the NFL and DirecTV did not renew the Sunday Ticket package.  Id. 
 151. See Siranosian, supra note 7, at 353; NFL Sunday Ticket, NFL (last visited Sept. 10, 2020), 
http://www.nfl.com/nflsundayticket. 
 152. In re Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 933 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 
2019) (quoting Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 196).  This means that the NFL only has the authority to 
“enter into . . . agreements with networks, satellite TV providers, or internet streaming services.”  Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.  The price for commercial subscribers varies in response to the “capacity of the 
establishment, ranging from $2,314 to $120,000 per year.”  Id. 
 155. Id. 
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D. Consumers Take on the NFL in In re Nat’l Football League’s Sunday 
Ticket Antitrust Litigation 
A landmark lawsuit resulting from the Sunday Ticket involved “a case 
brought [in 2015] by a group of Sunday Ticket subscribers against the NFL 
and DirecTV.”156  Initially, twenty-seven related class action suits against 
various NFL and DirecTV entities—FOX, CBS, NBC, and ESPN––were 
filed separately; however, they were eventually consolidated into a single, 
multidistrict lawsuit.157  “Four plaintiffs . . . filed a consolidated complaint 
against the [NFL], NFL Enterprises LLC, all [thirty-two] individual NFL 
teams, DirecTV Holdings LLC, and DirecTV, LLC.”158  The plaintiffs 
claimed that the “defendants’ interlocking agreements work[ed] together to 
suppress competition for the sale of professional football game telecasts in 
violation of [§ I] and [§ II] of the Sherman Antitrust Act.”159 
All of the plaintiffs, including both businesses and residents, had 
purchased Sunday Ticket packages.160  The plaintiffs alleged that without 
both the Teams-NFL and NFL-DirecTV exclusive agreements, other 
distributors would be able to telecast the games shown exclusively in the 
Sunday Ticket package.161  Furthermore, without these agreements, the 
thirty-two teams could individually arrange their game telecasts and “could 
contract with competing distribution channels or media, including other 
 
 156. McCann, supra note 85. 
 157. In re NFL Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., No. ML 15-02668-BRO (JEMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 121354, *1–2 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2017). 
 158. In re Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 933 F.3d 1136, 1148–49 (9th 
Cir. 2019). 
 159. Id. at 1149.  The plaintiffs represent both “residential and commercial NFL Sunday Ticket 
subscribers,” which makes them both direct and indirect purchasers.  Id. at 1148.  The plaintiffs 
included Ninth Inning, Inc., 1465 Third Avenue Restaurant Corp., Robert Gary Lippincott, Jr., and 
Michael Holinko.  Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 1149.  The Ninth Circuit clarified that the Teams-NFL agreement is the agreement 
between all the NFL teams and the NFL to pool the teams’ telecasting rights, giving the NFL the 
sole authority to those rights.  Id. at 1148.  Furthermore, the NFL-DirecTV agreement is the 
agreement that permits DirecTV on behalf of the NFL “to obtain all of the live telecasts produced by 
CBS and FOX, package those telecasts, and deliver the bundled feeds to NFL Sunday Ticket 
subscribers.”  Id.  The NFL-Network agreement is CBS and FOX working together to create a sole 
telecast for every Sunday afternoon NFL game, and the NFL allows CBS and FOX to broadcast a 
finite amount of local games on free, over-the-air, television.  Id.  These are the interlocking 
agreements that the plaintiffs allege violate §§ I and II of the Sherman Act by suppressing 
competition “for the sale of professional football game telecasts.”  Id. at 1149. 
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cable, satellite or internet carriers or competing networks.”162  Allowing 
teams to individually sell the rights to their telecasts would result in 
considerable growth for NFL telecasts of games and wider accessibility for 
viewers at lowers costs.163 
The district court dismissed both the § I and § II claims, and on appeal 
the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal.164  The Ninth Circuit highlighted 
the significance of the NFL’s failure to contest the application of the SBA to 
both the agreements between the teams and DirecTV.165  Specifically, 
because the NFL did not contest the SBA’s application to satellite 
broadcasting, the court assumed that the SBA was “not applicable to the 
Teams-NFL or NFL-DirecTV Agreements.”166  Therefore, its analysis was 
predominantly based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of 
Regents.167  The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had adequately stated 
a cause of action for violations of “[§] I and [§] II of the Sherman Act that 
survive[d] a motion to dismiss” and “therefore [the court] reverse[d] the 
district court’s decision.”168  Ultimately, the court held that the interlocking 
agreements amounted to both § I and § II violations of the Sherman Act, and 
it found proper antitrust standing for the plaintiffs.169 
III. ANALYZING SPORTS TELECASTING: INJURY TO COMPETITION, MARKET 
MONOPOLIZATION, AND STANDING 
The Ninth Circuit, in In re National Football League’s Sunday Ticket 
Antitrust Litigation, properly established new precedent in ruling that the 
various interlocking agreements among the NFL, NFL teams, and DirecTV 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  If the defendants had contested the application of the SBA to the interlocking 
agreements, they may have been able to show that cable and satellite providers similarly fall within 
the exemption already given to broadcasters.  Id.  Thus, the DirecTV agreement may have fallen 
within the exemption.  Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.  The SBA permitted pooling agreements among the NFL and the teams to “share 
broadcast revenues” by “offer[ing] the NFL and the NFL teams an exemption from antitrust law.”  
Id.  Board of Regents “analyzed a similar league sport broadcasting arrangement under the Sherman 
Act, without any applicable statutory exemption.”  Id.; see also Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120–
21 (1984). 
 168. In re Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 933 F.3d at 1144. 
 169. Id. at 1158–59. 
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constituted antitrust violations under § I and § II of the Sherman Act.170  
However, the Court improperly contradicted Supreme Court precedent in 
granting standing to the plaintiffs, which has alarming consequences for 
future litigation.171 
A. To What Extent, if Any, Did the NFL Err in Injuring Competition? 
The NFL does not contest that under the first and second elements of a 
rule of reason analysis they have contracts for the purpose of restraining 
competition.172  However, they dispute the third and fourth elements under 
§ I, claiming that the plaintiffs do not adequately allege that this particular 
restraint (i.e., the Sunday Ticket package) injures competition.173 
The court found that the plaintiff’s allegations adequately alleged an 
injury to competition based on the similarity of both the Teams-NFL and 
NFL-DirecTV agreements to the agreement the court struck down in NFL II, 
in the context of college football.174  However, the NFL denied that the 
interlocking agreements resembled any precedent set by the courts, and 
instead argued that the Sunday Ticket package is a joint venture between the 
league and the teams.175 
Similar to NFL II, where the “agreement among college football teams 
and the NCAA violated [§ I] of the Sherman Act because [it] eliminated 
competition in the market for college football telecasts,” here the 
 
 170. See McCann, supra note 85. 
 171. See id. 
 172. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1150. 
 173. Id.  Under a rule of reason analysis, the plaintiff is required to establish the following: 
“(1) a contract, combination or conspiracy among two or more persons or distinct 
business entities; (2) by which the persons or entities intended to harm or restrain trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations; (3) which actually injures 
competition.”  Additionally, the plaintiffs must plead antitrust standing, meaning they 
must allege that (4) they are the proper parties to bring the antitrust action because they 
were harmed by the defendants’ contract, combination, or conspiracy, and the harm they 
suffered was caused by the anti-competitive aspect of the defendants’ conduct. 
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Brantly v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
 174. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 175. See McCann, supra note 85.  Here, McCann highlights that the NFL differentiated its 
telecasting agreements from those mentioned in prior Supreme Court cases, such as American 
Needle.  See id.  McCann also emphasizes that since Judge Smith sided with the NFL in Nat’l 
Football League, the league can, at minimum, have confidence in having at least one judge on its 
side.  See id. 
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interlocking agreements mirror those same restrictions.176  Where the 
agreement in NFL II imposed restrictions on the amount of televised 
intercollegiate football games and the total number of games any single team 
was permitted to televise, here, both the Teams-NFL and NFL-DirecTV 
agreements similarly restrict the total amount of televised NFL games that 
any single team can broadcast.177  Thus, the court identified the professional 
sporting version of the same prohibited agreements found in NFL II with the 
Sunday Ticket package here, which constitutes an injury to competition.178 
Moreover, in both cases the agreements restricted the teams from selling 
individual telecasting rights of the teams independent of the league.179  
Where the NFL II agreement explicitly constituted a horizontal restraint 
based on the necessity of votes by collegiate teams to enter into a contract, 
the Sunday Ticket package has an almost identical requirement that the NFL 
teams vote to approve the DirecTV agreement.180  Thus, the Court correctly 
held that both the Teams-NFL and NFL-DirecTV agreements constitute 
horizontal agreements among competitors, because they “place[] an artificial 
limit on the quantity of televised football that is available [for sale] to 
broadcasters and consumers.”181 
The NFL also failed to properly argue that the Teams-NFL and NFL-
DirecTV agreements should have been analyzed separately under In re 
Musical Instruments.182  If the court analyzed such agreements separately, it 
would consider the NFL-DirecTV agreement a presumptively legal 
exclusive distribution agreement that does not injure competition.183  
However, In re Musical Instruments does not explicitly require courts to 
analyze such agreements individually.184  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit cited 
to Board of Regents where the Supreme Court explicitly held that there are 
 
 176. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1151. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 180. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1151–52. 
 181. Id. at 1152 (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99 
(1984)).  
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. In re Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186, 1191–92 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(classifying antitrust claims as “horizontal” or “vertical” and establishing that “horizontal 
agreements violate the Sherman Act per se” and do not require a fact intensive inquiry that would 
involve analyzing individual agreements). 
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activities so inherently rooted in acting cooperatively that their activities can 
only be carried jointly––league sports are a prime example.185  Additionally, 
the court looked at the agreements holistically to see how they impact 
competition.186  In doing so, the court found that assessing injury to 
competition requires looking at the conspiracy as a whole, rather than 
“dismembering it and viewing its separate parts.”187  The purpose of doing 
this is to give the plaintiffs “the full benefit of their proof without tightly 
compartmentalizing the various factual components.”188 
Thus, the court’s choice to analyze the agreements together here is 
correct, especially when comparing the case at bar to In re Musical 
Instruments.189  Because the Supreme Court set clear precedent by carving 
out an explicit exception for how to analyze professional sports agreements–
–under a rule of reason analysis and not separately, and the Ninth Circuit 
found it necessary to analyze the agreements holistically, the league’s 
attempt to use Musical Instruments as a defense was weak from its outset.190 
The NFL again failed when attempting to argue against a § I violation 
by distinguishing the case at bar from American Needle.191  In American 
Needle, the Supreme Court granted the NFL single-entity status, providing 
an exemption from antitrust law for merchandising agreements.192  Here, the 
NFL failed to show how telecasts are different from separately owned 
merchandise.193  The NFL argued that telecasts can only be created through 
cooperation of the teams and the NFL, which should allow them to be 
considered a single entity.194  However, there is no precedent that requires 
both the teams and the NFL to work in tandem to create telecasts, so their 
 
 185. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984).  For example, 
when a professional sports league, such as professional soccer teams, is formed, “it would be 
pointless to declare their cooperation illegal on the ground that there are no other professional 
[soccer] teams.”  Id. 
 186. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1151–52. 
 187. Id. at 1152 (quoting United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 544 (1913)). 
 188. Id. (quoting Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 
(1962)).  
 189. Id. at 1152–53. 
 190. Id. at 1152–53. 
 191. Id. at 1153. 
 192. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 200–03 (2010).  The instances that 
allow the NFL to form collective agreements under a single-entity status, among all the franchises, 
are limited and cannot be considered for all purposes.  Id. at 200–04. 
 193. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1154. 
 194. Id. at 1153. 
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argument fails.195  Furthermore, the NFL asserted that the “NFL-DirecTV 
agreement did not reduce the output of NFL game broadcasts” because every 
NFL Sunday afternoon game is broadcast somewhere as free television.196  
Thus, the NFL insisted that there was “no [restriction] on output as a matter 
of law.”197  However, in accordance with Board of Regents, the Court 
explicitly rejected the NFL’s argument that “the relevant output is ‘the total 
amount of televised’ [games] available to consumers.”198  Instead, the Court 
held that the interlocking agreements do, in fact, reduce output that causes 
injury to competition, given that member institutions are not free to sell 
telecasting rights under such agreements.199  The league’s attempt to justify 
granting consumers free over-the-air games when their team plays locally as 
sufficient to not reduce output, does, in fact, reduce output and harms their 
fan base who are either unwilling or unable to pay the annual subscription.200 
Finally, the NFL argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege “a properly 
defined market in which [the NFL has] market power.”201  However, because 
“professional football games have no substitutes,” the NFL does, in fact, 
have complete and utter control over the market for professional football 
game telecasts.202  The Court correctly held that the interlocking agreements 
satisfied the injury to competition element of § I of the Sherman Act.203 
 
 195. Id.  The argument fails because the NFL teams can, without the interlocking agreements, 
compete against each other to sell their telecasting rights instead of having the NFL pool all 
telecasting rights for every team, and split the revenue among the teams themselves.  Id. at 1154. 
 196. Id. at 1155. 
 197. Id.; see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 94 (1984) (“[The 
current plan] limits the total amount of televised intercollegiate football and the number of games 
that any one team may televise.”). 
 198. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1155 (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of 
Regents, 468 U.S. at 94). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See McCann, supra note 85 (“[P]laintiffs argue that the league’s prohibition financially 
harms fans since it eliminates competition in the market for live telecasts[, whereas] the NFL reasons 
that its deal with DirecTV has made life better, not worse, for consumers since they can essentially 
watch any NFL game regardless of where they live.”). 
 201. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1155. 
 202. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1393 (9th Cir. 
1984) (examining the NFL’s relevant market competition). 
 203. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1156. 
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B. Monopolizing the Market on Its Face 
Next, the Court analyzed whether the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a § II 
violation of the Sherman Act.204  Both plaintiffs adequately asserted injury to 
competition because the interlocking agreements amounted to a conspiracy 
to monopolize the market for professional football telecasts, and “[the NFL 
has sufficient] market power in the market for professional football 
telecasts.”205  The exclusive deal explicitly granted DirecTV monopoly 
power over each and every out-of-market game, and the NFL willingly 
granted DirecTV the ability to “acquire and maintain that monopoly power 
in the relevant product market.”206  If the interlocking agreements were not 
created to maintain market power and did not maintain such power, then 
other carriers would be able to bid for the contract when the DirecTV 
agreement expired.207 
Nonetheless, the NFL continues to renew the agreement each year with 
DirecTV.208  If the NFL opened the bidding to carriers other than DirecTV 
when the initial agreement with DirecTV expired, or at least one other 
carrier in addition to DirecTV, it is less likely that a § II violation would 
exist.209  Thus, the Court correctly concluded that both the Teams-NFL and 
NFL-DirecTV agreements were created to maintain market power, sufficient 
to amount to the specific intent necessary to monopolize a relevant 
market.210 
Although the Court’s analysis was precise in finding both § I and § II 
violations of the Sherman Act, the Court reached a troubling conclusion in 
terms of standing.211 
 
 204. Id. at 1158; see also supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text (examining industries where 
there has been monopolization due to GFTC inaction).  A § II violation not only constitutes a 
conspiracy to monopolize but is an actual monopolization.  Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1159.  
To demonstrate a conspiracy to monopolize claim, a plaintiff must properly show: “1) the existence 
of a combination or conspiracy to monopolize; 2) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; 
3) the specific intent to monopolize; and 4) casual antitrust injury.”  See Siranosian, supra note 7, at 
366. 
 205. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1159. 
 206. See Brodkin, supra note 3. 
 207. See supra notes 148–149 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra notes 148–149 and accompanying text. 
 209. See Brodkin, supra note 3. 
 210. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1159. 
 211. Id. at 1158 (holding that there was standing because the plaintiffs suffered an antitrust injury 
due to the NFL and DirecTV’s conspiracy to limit output). 
[Vol. 48: 537, 2021] The New Era of NFL Antitrust Law 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
565 
C. Opening the Floodgates of Unprecedented Standing 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in allowing the plaintiffs to have standing 
directly contradicts Supreme Court precedent in Illinois Brick Co. v. 
Illinois.212  In Illinois Brick, the Court established a bright-line rule that 
“only direct purchasers have standing to pursue antitrust claims.”213  The 
plaintiffs here are indirect purchasers because they are “two or more steps 
removed from the violator in a distribution chain,” as they are bar and 
restaurant owners who purchased the Sunday Ticket package from DirecTV, 
not from the NFL directly.214  This standard is referred to as the “principle[] 
of proximate cause.”215  The only exception to barring indirect purchasers is 
referred to as the co-conspirator exception, as established by Arizona v. 
Shamrock Foods Co. and In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation.216  If a direct 
purchaser “conspires to fix the price paid by the plaintiffs, then the plaintiffs 
pay the fixed price directly and are not [considered] indirect purchasers”; 
rather, the plaintiffs are considered to be injured directly by the violation and 
therefore have antitrust standing.217 
The court should have adhered to the bright-line rule from Illinois Brick 
 
 212. Matt Bernardini, NFL Asks 9th Circ. to Reverse Decision Reviving DirecTV Suit, LAW360 
(Aug. 27, 2019) https://www.law360.com/articles/1193007/nfl-asks-9th-circ-to-reverse-decision-
reviving-directv-suit. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 
1520–21). 
 215. Id.  The Court rationalized “that allowing every purchaser in a distribution chain to claim 
damages flowing from a single antitrust violation” would result in significant risk of multiple 
liability for defendants.  Id.  Furthermore, the Court predicted that allowing indirect purchasers to 
sue would create “evidentiary complexities and uncertainties.”  Id. (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. 
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977)).  For example, if “‘manufacturer A sells to retailer B, and retailer 
B sells to consumer C, then C may not sue A.’  However, ‘C may sue B if B is an antitrust violator.’”  
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1521 (2019)).  The “principle[] of proximate 
cause” is applied differently when the plaintiff’s injury is the result of a “multi-level conspiracy to 
violate antitrust laws,” which is what the court here compares the interlocking agreements to.  Id. 
 216. Id. at 1156–57; see also In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(explaining that the cardholders who alleged that banks “colluded to fix the . . . interchange fee” for 
an ATM network, which was “passed on to [the cardholders] as part of the foreign ATM fee” that 
cardholders were charged when withdrawing money, were indirect purchasers, and thus prohibited 
from bringing suit under Illinois Brick); Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1210, 1214 
(9th Cir. 1984) (holding that defendant dairy product producers were not found to be involved in a 
“wholesale price-fixing conspiracy” because there was no need for “the complicated allocation of an 
illegal overcharge sought to be avoided in Illinois Brick”). 
 217. In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 750. 
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prohibiting any indirect purchaser claims, especially because the price-fixing 
conspiracy exception carved out in the case does not apply here.218  To show 
that the plaintiffs properly had antitrust standing, the fourth element of a § II 
violation of the Sherman Act, plaintiffs must show they were “harmed by the 
injury to competition” and that the harm was directly caused by the antitrust 
violator.219  Here, neither were the plaintiffs harmed by the injury to 
competition nor was the harm directly caused by the antitrust violator 
because they did not purchase the Sunday Ticket Package from the NFL 
directly.220  Therefore, the NFL was justified in challenging the Teams-NFL 
agreement.221 
The plaintiffs’ allegation that the interlocking Teams-NFL and NFL-
DirecTV agreements amount to a single conspiracy to restrict the output of 
NFL telecasts is misplaced for three reasons.222  First, the Ninth Circuit “has 
already rejected the Majority’s notion that the Illinois Brick rule does not 
apply when an alleged conspiracy has the same anti-competitive effect as 
fixing the consumer price.”223  Second, the argument that the NFL conspired 
to reduce the output of telecasting rights is not equivalent to the price-fixing 
conspiracy that Illinois Brick sought to prevent.224  Third, the co-conspirator 
exception only applies when “the co-conspirators fix the price paid by the 
plaintiff,” a claim that even the plaintiffs did not allege.225 
In Shamrock Foods Co., the Ninth Circuit held that the joint action 
between dairy producers and grocery retailers amounted to a conspiracy.226  
 
 218. Lesley E. Weaver et al., That’s The Ticket––Game On for Plaintiffs Challenging Suppression 
of The Market for Football Broadcasts, CALIFORNIA LAWYERS ASS’N (last visited Sept. 12, 2020), 
https://calawyers.org/antitrust-ucl-and-privacy/thats-the-ticket-game-on-for-plaintiffs-challenging-
suppression-of-the-market-for-football-broadcasts/. 
 219. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1156. 
 220. See Bernardini, supra note 212. 
 221. See id. 
 222. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1160–62 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 223. Id. at 1160.  The dissent emphasized that it “simply does not matter that the alleged pre-
market conspiracy has the same effect as setting a specific market price . . . [and] [s]imilarly it does 
not matter that the ultimate consumers ‘are purchasing from a violator’ of the Sherman Act.”  Id. at 
1161 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 755 (9th Cir. 
2012)).  If the party “challenging anti-competitive behavior relies on a pass-on theory of injury, it 
may recover damages only if it alleges and demonstrates a conspiracy that actually sets the consumer 
price––not just a conspiracy that may have the same practical effect.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 224. Id. at 1161–62. 
 225. Id. at 1162 (quoting In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 752). 
 226. Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir. 1984). 
[Vol. 48: 537, 2021] The New Era of NFL Antitrust Law 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
567 
Here, the court likewise concluded that the interlocking agreements 
amounted to a conspiracy to limit the output of NFL telecasts.227  However, 
because the Teams-NFL agreement, on its face, requires a pass-on theory of 
injury,228 the co-conspirator exception cannot, and does not, apply; thus, the 
interlocking agreements are not similar to the conspiracy in Shamrock Foods 
Co.229  Here, not only do the plaintiffs fail to allege a conspiracy of price-
fixing by the NFL teams, but they allege only that the price set by DirecTV 
was “artificially high” for consumers.230  Therefore, the co-conspirator 
exception does not apply.231  To have standing, the plaintiffs would have to 
show, at the very least, that the NFL teams either set or conspired to set “the 
actual price paid by any consumers”; otherwise, there is no price-fixing, no 
co-conspirator exception triggered by price-fixing, and the result is a 
conclusion that goes against the very core of what Illinois Brick sought to 
prevent.232  Ultimately, the plaintiffs did not allege, either implicitly or 
 
 227. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1159 (majority opinion). 
 228. Id. at 1160 (Smith, J., dissenting).  Requiring a pass-on theory of injury means any 
overcharge between a manufacturer and direct purchaser was “passed-on” to consumers through 
another level in the distribution chain.  Id. at 1159.  However, if the co-conspirator exception applied 
because of price-fixing, there would be no complicated equation to figure out the cost of damages 
because no overcharge was passed on to consumers.  Id. at 1160. 
 229. Id.  The co-conspirator exception is when “a plaintiff alleges a price-fixing conspiracy 
between a manufacturer and the direct purchaser.”  Id.  This is the exception to the bright-line rule in 
Illinois Brick that prevents indirect purchasers from having standing.  Id.  When there is such a 
“price-fixing conspiracy, the court need not engage in a complex damages calculation, because the 
overcharge ‘was not passed on to the consumers through any other level in the distribution chain.’”  
Id. (citing Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d at 1214 (9th Cir. 1984)).  On the other hand, under Illinois 
Brick, the Court established a rule that prohibits indirect purchasers from using a pass-on theory to 
recover damages for antitrust claims.  Id. at 1159.  The rationale for this rule was to reduce concerns 
that “pass-on theories of recovery would require courts to ‘trace a wholesale overcharge through an 
intermediary and allocate the retail price between an unlawful wholesale overcharge and market 
forces.’”  Id. (quoting Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d at 1214).  Allowing indirect purchasers to use 
pass-on theories of recovery would potentially inundate the courts with plaintiffs who may have 
“absorbed part of the overcharge from direct purchasers to middlemen to ultimate consumers[, 
namely themselves].”  Id. at 1160. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id.  The argument made by the plaintiffs here regarding the artificially high price for 
consumers would require analysis that Illinois Brick prohibits.  See id; see also Illinois Brick Co. v. 
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745–46 (1977)).  This allegation would require the court to analyze “whether 
the payment DirecTV made to the NFL for the telecast rights was an overpayment, how much of an 
overpayment it was (relative to what DirecTV would have had to pay had the NFL [t]eams not 
agreed to pool all of their broadcast rights), and how much of that overpayment was actually then 
passed on to the consumers.”  Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1160 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 232. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1160 (Smith, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also 
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explicitly, that the NFL and DirecTV were co-conspirators to fix the price 
paid by the plaintiffs.233  Accordingly, the exception cannot apply.234 
Furthermore, while the majority found that there was in fact a price-
fixing conspiracy between the distributor and manufacturer sufficient to 
apply the standard in Illinois Brick, the plaintiffs’ allegation that the NFL 
and DirecTV were involved in an output-reduction conspiracy for television 
broadcast rights also does not diminish the concerns set forth in Illinois 
Brick.235  Specifically, consumer injury as a result of an output-reduction 
conspiracy is still conditional on a pass-on theory of damages.236  Once 
again, this calculation of damages, unlike what is involved in a price-fixing 
conspiracy, is precisely what Illinois Brick aimed to avoid.237 
The court should have followed the Eight Circuit’s decision in Campos 
v. Ticketmaster Corp., where the court addressed the detrimental impact that 
raises concern here.238  In Campos, music fans attempted to sue Ticketmaster 
for the inflated prices that various venues charged for admission.239  
However, after weighing concerns of defying Illinois Brick, the court held 
that the plaintiffs did not have antitrust standing because the “complications 
in assessing responsibility for overcharges” in “[a]llowing the ultimate 
buyers of tickets to sue would necessitate tough questions about whether the 
venues were passing on monopoly costs.”240  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision will result in more complex litigation for indirect purchasers 
 
Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 745 (arguing that the pass-on theory of damages would both increase the 
cost and diffuse the benefits of bringing antitrust actions, impairing their effectiveness). 
 233. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1160 (Smith, J., dissenting) 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 1161; see also Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 744–46 (1977) (stating the 
court’s concerns regarding increased complexity and reduced effectiveness of antitrust lawsuits 
brought by indirect purchasers).  
 236. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1161 (Smith, J., dissenting).  In these cases, courts have 
to assess the amount of the consumer price that derives from “ordinary market forces[] and how 
much of it stems from the distributor’s efforts to recoup its overpayment to the manufacturer.”  Id. 
(citing Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 744–46).  
 237. Id. at 1162; see also Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 744–45 (stating that the complex “process of 
classifying various market situations according to the amount of pass-on likely to be involved and its 
susceptibility of proof in a judicial forum” would lead to uncertainty, reducing the incentive to sue). 
 238. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 239. Id. at 1169. 
 240. See Gardner, supra note 6; see also Campos, 140 F.3d at 1170 (weighing concerns of defying 
Illinois Brick: either attempting the complex task of apportioning the payment of overcharges 
between direct and indirect purchasers or allowing duplicative recovery).  
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looking to fit under the same exception.241  Additionally, those who 
traditionally did not fit under the exception will likely see this as an 
opportunity to secure standing against large corporations and sports leagues, 
opening the floodgates for an influx of lawsuits that courts are likely 
unprepared to hear and decide.242 
Because Illinois Brick unequivocally bars any plaintiffs from having 
antitrust standing to sue if they are an indirect purchaser, unless the co-
conspirator exception applies, the Court would be forced to create an 
entirely new exception in order to properly grant antitrust standing to the 
plaintiffs here.243  The Court in Illinois Brick both justified and warned 
against creating additional exceptions “to the [indirect purchaser] rule for 
particular types of markets,” which is precisely what the court is doing here 
by granting standing to the plaintiffs.244 
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION: THE NFL, 
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, AND THE FLOOD OF PLAINTIFFS WITHOUT LEGAL 
STANDING 
The impact of the Ninth Circuit’s decision may cause a revolution in the 
television industry because NFL teams may have the freedom to individually 
sell their telecasting rights, which would give consumers greater autonomy 
to choose a carrier based on price.245  This decision may also serve as a 
model for both existing and future agreements for all other league sports.246  
 
 241. See Campos, 140 F.3d at 1170. 
 242. See id.; see also Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1162 (Smith, J., dissenting).  
 243. Nat’l Football League, 933 F.3d at 1162; see also Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 
736 (1977) (precluding indirect purchasers from recovering under a pass-on theory of damages). 
 244. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736; see also Campos, 140 F.3d at 1171 (explaining that “[w]hile 
the Supreme Court has recognized that the ‘economic assumptions underlying the Illinois Brick rule 
might be disproved in a specific case,’ the Court has also made it [clear] that it considers it an 
‘unwarranted and counterproductive enterprise to litigate a series of exceptions’”). 
 245. See Erin Dingmann, National Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litigation: How 
Broadcasting Exclusivity Is a DirecT(V) Hindrance to Consumers, 27 SPORTS L. J. 271, 284–85 
(2020) (showing that while all other prominent professional sports leagues offer various out-of-
market packages that are substantially similar to that of the NFL Sunday Ticket package, only the 
NFL has an exclusive contract for this package with a single cable provider). 
 246. See Alex Sherman, Here’s How NFL TV Rights Are Expected to Shake Out for the Rest of the 
Decade, According to Sources, CNBC (Feb. 23, 2020, 2:54 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2020/02/22/nfl-tv-rights-up-for-renewal-in-2022-and-big-media-will-pay-more.html (discussing that 
in the upcoming battle for NFL broadcasting rights, the possibility of a streaming service such as 
ESPN+ or YouTube TV buying the NFL Sunday Ticket rights from DirecTV may lead to massive 
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Furthermore, the timing of the decision could not be more significant 
because all of the NFL’s current agreements with broadcasters are set to 
expire in the coming years, along with the collective bargaining agreement 
between the league and its teams.247 
A. The Future of the NFL Without Exemptions 
Although consumers who are frustrated paying astronomical fees every 
football season for the Sunday Ticket package may see the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision as a victory, they may not realize the impact it will have on weaker 
NFL teams and their future on television.248  Without the NFL’s exemption 
for pooling the teams’ telecasting rights, each team will have to individually 
negotiate its television contracts.249  While having teams individually 
negotiate their agreements appears to adhere to the purpose of antitrust law 
by allowing competition in the marketplace, it could be detrimental to 
weaker NFL teams.250  Weaker teams may struggle to get local coverage of 
games, let alone attempt to nationally broadcast them.251  Not only will each 
of the thirty-two individual franchises lose the NFL’s oversight of their 
telecasting rights, but “the Ninth Circuit may have jeopardized the NFL’s 
longstanding broadcast model, an arrangement that currently generates $5.7 
billion per year from the TV networks alone.”252  However, a world where 
each individual team retains all the television rights to its games opens the 
possibility of individually “producing telecasts and licensing them to digital 
streamers.”253 
Regardless of how the removal of the pooling arrangement will hurt the 
NFL and its teams, the current arrangement hurts consumers even more 
 
changes in traditional broadcasting through sports, likely lowering costs for consumers in the 
process). 
 247. Id. (highlighting that the NFL’s broadcasting rights are set to expire in 2022). 
 248. See Malanga, supra note 45. 
 249. See id. 
 250. See id. 
 251. See id.  Malanga illustrates this point by using the Dallas Cowboys and Cleveland Browns as 
an example; a powerhouse team such as the Cowboys would likely secure national broadcasting of 
all their games with ease, whereas the Browns would likely struggle for even local coverage.  See id. 
 252. Anthony Crupi, For NFL Rights-Holders, the Clock on the Wall Reads ‘Miller Time,’ 
ADAGE (Dec. 6, 2019), https://adage.com/article/sports/nfl-rights-holders-clock-wall-reads-miller-
time/2221086. 
 253. Gardner, supra note 6.  These digital streamers may include Disney’s ESPN, NBC’s 
Peacock, or even selling individual games to multiple streamers.  Id. 
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through inflated prices.254  The court’s decision to make the Sunday Ticket 
package nonexclusive will not only allow other carriers to properly compete 
with the individual teams to secure contracts, but will also allow the 
consumers themselves to have greater autonomy than what is available to 
them now to choose a carrier based on pricing.255  Consumers deserve to be 
offered fair pricing, rather than suffer at the hands of the NFL’s desire to 
equally distribute a hefty chunk of revenue to each team via pooled 
telecasting rights.256 
Moreover, the NFL is unlike all other professional sports leagues, which 
further justifies not applying the exemption.257  The NFL is one of the only 
major sports leagues in the United States that has an exclusive 
distributorship agreement with either cable or satellite for out-of-market 
games.258  Other professional sports leagues in the United States similarly 
have “broadcasting deals with cable channels and other subscriber-based 
networks”; however, they do not rise to the level of exclusive distributorship 
as the NFL-DirecTV agreement does.259  If anything, the impact of the Ninth 
Circuit ruling may positively influence how sports leagues handle their 
television agreements by serving as a cautionary example for other leagues 
entering into new agreements.260  This impact can be seen in the inevitable 
scrutiny these sports leagues have already faced, and likely will continue to 
 
 254. See Bublick, supra note 20, at 244–45 (Every “few years DirecTV [pays] the NFL 
exponentially more money for the exclusive right to Sunday Ticket, and consumers are picking up 
the tab.  While the free market dictates that consumers will only pay as much as a service or product 
is worth to them, this principle does not apply in this case because Sunday Ticket is only available 
through DirecTV and many NFL fans have no choice but to pay more than they think is fair.  Even 
though other carriers have made offers that, when combined with the likely offers of other carriers, 
would be more than what DirecTV is currently paying, the NFL has balked for unknown reasons.”). 
 255. See Bublick, supra note 20,  at 245. 
 256. See id. at 243–45. 
 257. Brodkin, supra note 3. 
 258. Id.  Among the four major professional sports in the United States––hockey, basketball, 
football, and baseball––the NFL is the only league with “an exclusive out of market broadcasting 
arrangement.”  Id.  The National Hockey League, National Basketball Association, and Major 
League Baseball “all distribute live out of market games through multiple MVPDs [multichannel 
video programming distributors], including, for example, DirecTV, Dish Network, Comcast, Cox 
Cable[,] and Time Warner.”  Id.  Therefore, consumers who watch other sports leagues’ games do 
not pay nearly as much as football fans, and those consumers have a much wider range of access to 
watching more games per week.  Id. 
 259. See McCann, supra note 85. 
 260. See id. 
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face, under antitrust law.261 
The future of the NFL without the exemption stands to benefit both 
consumers and potential carriers, at the cost of weaker NFL teams being 
overshadowed by powerhouse franchises.262 
B. Giving Consumers a Voice in the Courtroom by Contradicting Supreme 
Court Precedent 
Although the Ninth Circuit scored a touchdown by ruling in favor of 
removing the exemption, the decision was troubling because it granted 
standing to plaintiffs who had no legal standing.263  The rationale for 
requiring the plaintiffs who have antitrust standing to be the direct purchaser 
of the service is that they have to be the ones who would be directly harmed 
by the injury to competition.264  Here, the consumers have not directly 
purchased anything from the NFL,265 and the core reasoning of Illinois Brick 
was to prevent those who are not direct purchasers from having standing to 
avoid “the evidentiary complexities and uncertainties” that would arise.266  
Plaintiffs who may be weary of suing powerhouse corporations and entities, 
such as the NFL and DirecTV, may see the plaintiffs in the case at bar—
consumers and business owners—as success stories and be motivated to 
pursue their own antitrust lawsuits, subsequently inundating the courts with 
 
 261. See id.  In 2016, a lawsuit with the MLB, which challenged the league’s broadcasting 
policies under antitrust law, resulted in restricting the MLB from raising the prices for both “its 
single-team and league-wide MLB . . . TV packages,” meaning the MLB would likely only be able 
to raise its prices a few dollars annually until the settlement agreement expires.  Nathaniel Grow, 
More Details on the MLB TV Lawsuit Settlement, INSTAGRAPHS (Jan. 20, 2016), 
https://blogs.fangraphs.com/instagraphs/more-details-on-the-mlb-tv-lawsuit-settlement/.  The 
settlement also required the MLB to agree to permit cable and satellite service providers the “option 
to sell single-team Extra Innings packages . . . [and] [w]hile these providers aren’t obligated to offer 
a single-team service under the terms of the settlement, if they do elect to do so then they must offer 
packages for all [thirty] teams, and not just the league’s most popular clubs.”  Id.  Lastly, the 
settlement gave a voice to fans who have been wronged by allowing “anyone . . . completely unable 
to receive [a] cable or satellite television service at their home [to] be able to petition [the] MLB for 
the ability to stream in-market games via MLB . . . TV.”  Id. 
 262. See Grow, supra note 261. 
 263. See Bronstad, supra note 1. 
 264. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977). 
 265. See Gardner, supra note 6. 
 266. In re Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 933 F.3d 1136, 1156 (9th Cir. 
2019) (quoting Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 732). 
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plaintiffs who may have been affected by an antitrust violation.267 
Not only is it concerning that the court directly defied Supreme Court 
precedent, but if the Ninth Circuit’s decision is left “undisturbed” it will 
impact the economy outside of just sports.268  Put differently, if the decision 
takes effect, it will reduce “inter-brand competition whenever affiliated 
entities get together to create something.”269 
Lastly, the timing of this decision is significant.270  All of the NFL’s 
current agreements with broadcasters are set to expire in the next few years, 
and the collective bargaining agreement between the league and its players is 
on the horizon.271  Historically, the most significant point of contention for 
these agreements is the “split of TV money.”272  As a result, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision is not only going to be pivotal for the league and its teams, 
but also for the television industry as a whole.273 
 
 267. Id. at 1159–60 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 268. See Gardner, supra note 6. 
 269. See id.  This issue of standing and the Ninth Circuit’s decision is also a point of contention 
for the entertainment industry, as seen most recently in 2019 where Apple’s lawsuit in the Supreme 
Court left open questions relating to who has antitrust standing and the kind of impact granting such 
standing can have in different contexts.  Eriq Gardner, How Apple’s Loss at Supreme Court Could 
Impact Entertainment, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (May 13, 2019), https://www. 
hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/apples-loss-at-supreme-court-could-impact-entertainment-sector-
1210031 [hereinafter Gardner, Apple’s Loss at Supreme Court].  In 2019, YouTube TV subscribers 
were upset when the price for an “online bundle of television networks” was going to rise.  Id.  
Google entered into a content licensing deal with Discovery, and the result was that YouTube TV 
“passed along the cost to consumers . . . [where] [n]o longer would YouTube TV cost $40 a month.”  
Id.  “Instead, the service would be priced at $50, or even more[, and] . . . those who signed up for the 
service through Apple had to pay $55.”  Id.  Similar to the cost consumers have to pay for the 
Sunday Ticket Package, here consumers were also stuck paying “supracompetitive prices.”  Id.  In 
this case, the district court rejected the class action against Apple because the court found that the 
app developer, not Apple, was the one setting the prices and selling directly to consumers, “even if 
such price was influenced by what Apple was charging the app developer to access its electronic 
store.”  Id.  However, although the Ninth Circuit reversed the case before it reached the Supreme 
Court, once it did, the court did not find it proper to prevent app purchasers from suing Apple “for 
the way it allegedly has leveraged its monopoly.”  Id.  Justice Kavanaugh stated that “[i]f a retailer 
has engaged in unlawful monopolistic conduct that has caused consumers to pay higher-than-
competitive prices, it does not matter how the retailer structured its relationship with an upstream 
manufacturer or supplier––whether, for example, the retailer employed a markup or kept a 
commission.”  Id. 
 270. See Gardner, supra note 6. 
 271. See id. 
 272. See id. 
 273. See id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Picture a world where each NFL team has the ability to own the 
telecasting rights to its games: a world where consumers are not limited to a 
choice between a finite amount of free, over-the-air, local football games or 
paying hundreds of dollars per season to ensure access to every game.274  
This world is possible where all thirty-two teams have the ability to produce 
and license telecasts to not only other potential satellite and cable providers, 
but to digital streamers as well.275 
The Ninth Circuit has made this vision a possibility by holding that both 
the NFL-Teams and NFL-DirecTV agreements constitute § I and § II 
violations of the Sherman Act.276  Thus, the court has removed the 
exemption that the NFL has hidden behind for years.277  Such a ruling will 
not only set the precedent for how the NFL will operate moving forward, but 
it will serve as a warning for other professional sports leagues when entering 
into distributorship agreements.278  Nevertheless, granting standing to 
indirect purchasers weakens the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and undermines the 
legitimacy of future plaintiffs who aim to sue on similar grounds.279 
There is no question that football––a game of “strategy, foresight, and 
intuition”—is one of America’s favorite sports.280  With an average of over 
16 million viewers per game, the league should be vigilant moving forward 
by focusing on their consumers to “[make] its games accessible to as many 
people as possible.”281  The current interlocking agreements between the 
NFL, its teams, and DirecTV does not benefit anyone except DirecTV and 
the league, resulting in dissatisfied consumers who are frustrated with prices 
and carriers who are prohibited from engaging in competition within the 
market.282  While scholars have encouraged the NFL in the past to 
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“relinquish its stranglehold over [the] Sunday Ticket [and] . . . voluntarily 
terminate the exclusive contract for publicity purposes,” the Ninth Circuit 
has now made the decision for the NFL––albeit at the expense of directly 
contradicting Supreme Court precedent.283 
On February 7, 2020, the NFL “[filed] a high-stakes petition to the U.S. 
Supreme Court” in regards to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.284  On Monday, 
November 2, 2020, the Supreme Court “declined . . . to review [the] lower 
court[’s] decision.”285  Justice Brett Kavanaugh stated that although “a 
decision of such legal and economic significance might warrant [the 
Supreme Court’s] review . . . the case comes to [the high court] at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage, and the interlocutory posture is a factor counseling 
against that.”286  Justice Kavanaugh made sure to emphasize that declining to 
review the case at this point in time does not constitute agreement with the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding, and even went as far as suggesting that the NFL and 
DirecTV may have “a valid case” to petition the Court once more “if they 
lose in the lower courts” because the Ninth Circuit’s decision is “in 
substantial tension with antitrust principles and precedents.”287  It is also 
worth noting that Justice Kavanaugh recognized that the plaintiffs in this 
case may not have antitrust standing to sue the NFL and its teams, regardless 
of having a valid case to petition the court in the future, because they are 
indirect purchasers.288  
If the case had moved forward, the status quo would not have been 
immediately disrupted.289  The NFL likely would have either been able to 
justify its exemption with a reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s holding and 
“fatten [the] league’s profits without benefiting sports consumers,” or it 
would have been subject to “newfound legal scrutiny” with its broadcasting 
deals set to expire in the coming years.290  Although it would have behooved 
the Supreme Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s holding regarding standing 
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to prevent an influx of illegitimate cases moving forward,291 the future of the 
Sunday Ticket may nonetheless change for the better with streamers and 
“[d]igital powerhouses” ready to swoop in once all the NFL’s current TV 
agreements expire after the 2022 season.292 
Perhaps the solution to the league’s issue is lobbying Congress once 
more to have the SBA extended to include not only broadcasting, but cable 
and satellite providers as well; however, until such an action takes place, it is 
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